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The COVID-19 global pandemic has shone a light on the precarity of 
humanity like nothing else in our recent history – war takes the lives of 
the younger people and displaces many, but this virus is noted as an 
existential threat to the older as well as the socially and medically 
diminished members of society, disrupting global social and health 
systems in its wake. Whilst the United Nation’s Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) were already noted to be under-achieving, 
the objectives for 2030 now seem unattainable.  This jeopardizes basic 
human needs for survival such as food security and health, not least, 
because the underpinning assumptions on which the SDGs are based 
have been irrevocably changed by the pandemic (Naidoo and Fisher 
2020).  Indeed, Naidoo and Fisher (2020) argue that if nations were 
performing in line with the SDG targets concerned with poverty 
elimination, universal health access, and agricultural productivity, the 
pandemic would not have been the devasting wrecking-ball as it has 
been.  What is clear from the environmental research reported to date 
is that human proliferation and behavior (over-population, pollution, 
deforestation, degradation of land) has put pressure on the natural 
balance in our immediate environment and on the planetary 
ecosystems as a whole. This has resulted in loss of biodiversity and 
climate change.   
Some argue that the current pandemic is a ‘moment of truth’ in 
our evolution – a time for critical self-reflection and an opportunity for 
resolution where less consumption equals more focus on ‘things that 
matter’ such as local ecosystems. As Booker prize-winning author 
Arundhati Roy states “Historically, pandemics have forced humans to 
break with the past and imagine their world anew. This one is no 
different. It is a portal, a gateway between one world and the next…” 
(Roy 2020; see also Cambefort 2020 and Hong 2020 in MGDR). It is 
unsurprising that data released by NASA (National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration) and ESA (European Space Agency) intimate the 
reduction of pollution as a consequence of the (enforced) lack of 
movement of people during the global lockdowns; in the past year, this 
reduction has been as much as 30% in some areas such as Wuhan 
(China), Italy and Spain (e.g., Rupani et al. 2020). Yet, the pandemic 
has also exacerbated our relationship with technologies, especially 
information and communications technologies, in the race to ‘get 
online’ and ‘stay in touch’ as well as entertain and inform ourselves 
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through endless variety of multidimensional virtual platforms.  We have 
become cyborgs (Haraway 1985; Huang & Rust 2018) – of necessity – 
via a transhumanist melding of our bodies and minds with 
technologies, without which our now restricted human world would be 
significantly diminished.   
Attendant to this, we are now witnessing a global shortage of 
semiconductors as a consequence of disrupted supplies and increased 
demand.  Ever this was the trajectory: we have known for some time 
that our technology consumption patterns would be unsustainable.  
Current chip-based technologies are wholly reliant on the use of a finite 
supply of Earth’s resources such as minerals, fossil fuels and Rare 
Earth metals, 95% of which are accounted for by Chinese producers 
(Vekasi 2019).  Furthermore, the numerous attempts by an increasing 
number of government-backed public and private organizations to 
explore beyond the confines of our planet – the Moon, Mars, Jupiter, 
Saturn, Venus and various asteroids and comets – with the aim of 
examining potential opportunities for furthering human endeavor has 
gained new impetus, albeit this has been planned for years. Indeed, 
the pandemic seems to have accelerated not just transhuman and 
posthuman trends, but also post-global and extra-global trends (see 
the MGDR review of ‘Elysium’; Ulusoy 2020). 
We have reached a nexus which places new emphasis on our 
understanding of ourselves and our relationship with others – other 
nations, other species, other worlds. A critical question is: Does this 
mean that our transition into the posthuman is complete? It is therefore 
with some interest that I approached the review of Francesca 
Ferrando’s book (2019) titled Philosophical Posthumanism.  
The next several pages – the major part of this essay – are 
devoted to my review of this book, after which I return to my own 
commentary on what this book and ongoing research insights reflect on 
the emergent, fledgling post-pandemic settings. 
Review of Philosophical Posthumanism 
Philosophical Posthumanism provides a thought-provoking perspective 
on the different theories of how we are posthuman.  Its central position 
is that humans are entities indelibly interrelated with others, human and 
non-human, organic and inorganic, rather than agents acting through 
transcendental consciousness.  In fact, this monograph is a translation 
of a 2016 Italian version of Ferrando’s doctoral thesis, which itself was 
awarded the ‘Sainati’ Philosophical Prize by the president of Italy in 
2014.  Ferrando, it is worth noting, is the first person to have presented 
a TED talk on the posthuman in December 2012 and is the founding 
director of the New York Posthuman Research Group.  
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Amphibian, Rana temporaria [Common British frog] 
(image: author copyright) 
 
Her thesis presents two interrelated discourses, organized into 
three sections.  First, Ferrando presents a critical review of the different 
perspectives of the posthuman including terms she argues it now 
encompasses such as posthumanism, transhumanism, new 
materialism, anti-humanism, object-oriented ontology, posthumanities 
and metahumanities.  Second, her work extends the field by presenting 
new thoughts on ontology, epistemology and ethics in posthumanism.  
Third, she acknowledges how human others have evolved and how, in 
turn, these influence our understandings of what it means to be post-
human, by answering the question: of which post are we human? 
What is interesting is that her take is not a techno-reductionist 
perspective but one that explores existential potentials through notions 
of a self/other continuum, drawing initially on Foucault and Heidegger 
as a means to explore technology and its multifarious relationships with 
humans and others.  Similarly, her perspective of the human integrates 
the many dis-humanizing and anti-humanizing perspectives that have 
arisen in recent history, encompassing for example exclusionary 
discourse and practices such as sexism, racism, classism, ageism, 
homophobia, ableism, etc.  By developing her thesis on posthuman 
dualities arising as a consequence of hybrid practices with animals, 
machines, and non-human others, she raises issues related to bios 
(pertaining to human experience) as well as zoë (pertaining to 
biological life), touching on historical and biological concepts informed 
by Nietzsche (embodied characterization) and Maturana & Varela 
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(autopoiesis). She also examines new materialism as a lens, 
considering the nature in which the human is networked and 
encompassed within a network, drawing on Latour and Deleuze & 
Guattari to explore a multiverse perspective on speculative perceptions 
of self.   
These are all deeply conceptual themes and, as a reader, one is 
left with a feeling of having been presented with a delectable 
salmagundi or bag of Liquorice AllsortsTM from which to taste a 
persuasive preference.   
Perspectives 
Her review of philosophical perspectives helpfully begins by exploring 
the key differences between the posthuman and transhuman, drawing 
on a Western philosophical understanding of technological mediation 
versus biological enhancement.  In discussing post, she argues that 
theory is embodied in humanism, enacted by humans and accessed 
through an epistemic perspective of feminist self, being both plural and 
relational.  Posthumanism is defined as the mediated self and 
speculation about possible future human developments as a 
consequence of reflecting on what may have been omitted from 
human. It is the need to understand what has been omitted that 
situates her argument to develop a posthumanist agenda. 
Tracing developments in humanism through acceptance of 
‘anthropocentrism’, Ferrando discusses notions of other in the human 
condition. This essentially links to Braidotti’s (2002) notion of 
proliferating differences, placing those others defined by difference at 
the margins of society (witches, women, people of colour, disabled, 
queer, etc.).  It was Hassan (1977) who first discussed posthumanism 
in his work on postmodernism, as he explored the possibilities for post 
in an inclusive context.  Coupling this with development of cybernetic 
organisms (e.g., Haraway 1989) in the context of cultural 
posthumanism, Ferrando argues that humans become hybrid 
animate/mechanized entities, ultimately studied under a breadth of 
research themes (transhumanism, antihumanism, metahumanism, 
posthumanities, metahumanities, non-human turn, etc.); the 
distinctions between which are no longer clear.  Ultimately, the term 
posthuman captures it all.   
Indeed, in attempting to address the question ‘are we already 
posthuman?’ it is clear that the answer depends upon the perspective 
one takes.  From a transhuman perspective, the answer lays 
somewhere between ‘probably just about’ to ‘not quite yet’ (at least 
artificial organs such as pacemakers do work); but from a posthuman 
perspective, the answer is definitely yes, and we have been since our 
prehistoric ancestors first selected a hammerstone over 1.7M years 
ago. Of course, more philosophically, Ferrando refers to our 
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understanding and deconstruction of other through multiple threads of 
discourse in literature, rather than our state of being in the world.   
The discussion of transhuman highlights the very real 
challenges faced in developing an inclusive position: we are not born 
transhuman (until such time as molecular level interventions are 
common in the population á la Pearce’s ‘paradise engineering’), 
meaning other becomes a significant point of difference as a 
consequence of socio-cultural and economic conditions.  Thus, glocal 
in this context is not a choice: early proponents position it as a form of 
Enlightenment emanating from rationality, uncritical of progress 
through scientific and technological advancement (More 2003). In this 
regard, it is Foucault (1975) that highlighted how philosophy and social 
discourse are relationally linked to politics and power, where 
technology may be both simultaneously progressive and regressive, 
depending on one’s point of interaction.  For example, the atomic bomb 
may have ended hostilities between the US and Japan, but its 
consequences were dire for the Japanese people and profound for the 
rest of the World.  Similarly, the treatise on rationality has led to 
dominance of man, resulting in inequality, discrimination, enslavement 
and violence against the other. Furthermore, technological 
enhancement commonly associated with the transhuman movement 
advocates morphological freedom through bioengineering and self-
modification, often presented as a dualism or separation of mind from 
body (‘I think, therefore I am’).   
Extending this mind/body separation, Kurzweil’s (2005) 
Singularity is seen as an ultimate transcendence of technology over 
biology, where the mind overcomes the mortal coil of the flesh body.  
Transhumans may thereby somehow project their mind into the body of 
an-other, which may be human, machine or object, and live in 
perpetuity. Through another perspective or point in time related to a 
different socio-cultural evolutionary pattern, however, such separation 
may easily be constituted as uncritical, undesirable and self-harmful.   
Conversely, Ferrando examines the trajectory of the posthuman 
perspective of technology, highlighting it as a non-separate trait 
drawing on Heidegger’s praxis. Heidegger’s view of technology was 
that it is not simply a means to an end but a manner of revealing or 
‘enframing’ some aspect of human condition; hence, it is not the 
technology that may cause harm but the human who wields it.  She 
also draws on Nietzsche’s metamorphoses of the spirit, in which the 
human is portrayed as a bridge rather than a purpose, examining the 
role of God as a metaphor for authority or mediation in the posthuman 
turn.  Touching on a number of other philosophical movements (New 
Realism, Speculative Realism and Object-Oriented Ontology), she 
concludes that whilst posthuman is an umbrella term, it encompasses 
challenge to our understanding of the boundaries of what is considered 
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to be human. Post being the operative term: she positions 
philosophical posthumanism as comprising post-humanism, post-
anthropocentrism and post-dualism.  Post-humanism refers to 
understanding of the plurality of human-kind experiences; post-
anthropocentrism is the recognition that humans have been 
hierarchically privileged over non-humans through the ages; and, post-
dualism is the way in which self is diametrically symbolized against 
other (us/them, friend/enemy, etc.).   
Treading a delicate line, Ferrando’s text provides a re-
assessment of philosophical posthumanism, aligning her work closely 
to Braidotti’s key work, The Posthuman (2013).  It is the hybridization of 
man with other (animal, machine, object) that necessitates an altered 
view of the human. This does not contradict previous work on the 
posthuman but rather extends our understanding.  Braidotti’s work 
presents a map of main tenets including post- self, species, death and 
theory but, Ferrando argues, does not deal adequately with the 
separation between life and death.  She states that it is particularly 
important to understand where the human is decentred to in order to 
make sense of what may be new and different.  For example, in 
Western study, identity (humanist) is often centred in discourse which 
has resulted in ‘radical’ deconstruction of others at the periphery 
(women, blacks, queer, etc.). The dualities of hierarchical status that 
other implies, however, will always result in discrimination, so in 
Ferrando’s view, it is essential that post-dualism (or non-dualism) is 
embraced as a decentring tenet. This brings posthumanism closer to 
Eastern philosophy, and the ‘profound harmony’ of The Tao (e.g., 
Capra 2010).   
Post-humanism 
The second part of Ferrando’s book deals with the etymological, 
semantic, linguistic and scientific structures and construction of the 
term post[-]humanism, particularly in reflecting what human means.  
From an etymological standpoint, breaking the term into its constituent 
parts, post is a crowded space: post has been employed almost as a 
fashion statement, indicating what follows, beyond or after – post-
colonialism, post-truth, post-apocalyptic, and so on. Its role is to 
communicate the before, in essence emphasizing a trajectory of 
development and legitimizing the now. The hyphen too is a victim of 
fad, disappearing as terms become more commonplace, hence post-
humanism becomes posthumanism. Thus, her focal discussion is on 
the humanism part of the term, and its discontents, wherein she 
reflects on the nature of other and how this is represented through 
different lenses.   
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Ferrando argues that other is a necessary yet relational (semantic) 
configuration which enables us to make sense of interdependencies 
and affinities in the use of the term human.  She does this by drawing 
particularly on gender theory, using De Beauvoir’s (1949) observance 
of how woman is defined in sexual relation to man (‘one is not born, but 
rather becomes a woman’ p.301) and Irigaray’s (1974) view of how 
woman is simply absent rather than other.  In both cases, the concept 
of man (and other) becomes ritualized through a process, leading her 
to explore the question of how humanizing takes place through 
embodiment as a process.   
Her thesis is that posthumanism is praxis and thereby highlights 
the importance of using non-discriminatory language to explore 
process. This is extremely challenging to achieve particularly given 
McLuhan’s (1964) ‘medium is message’ truism reflecting the duality of 
the what and the how being embedded within cultural artefacts 
themselves.  Language is tied to culture but when extending this to 
include other, say animal, machine or object, the way and how 
becomes increasingly complex, multi-layered and multi-dimensional.  
Consider, for example, the mathematical code/language of polygons 
used to create virtualized humans, the algorithm/language used to 
generate routines and behaviours that are embodied in neural 
networks, and the storytelling/language embodied within creative 
practice such as dance and music.   
Understanding the process of humanizing is therefore not a 
trivial task.  The way she goes about this is by exploring what is 
excluded from the notion of the relational human through an analysis of 
dehumanization: how slaves, subhumans, nonhumans, monsters, 
automata and many other categories of humans at the periphery have 
been thought of beyond normalized ideas of man.  She then turns this 
around by asking what those categories of other humans experience in 
the humanizing process.  She argues that by doing this, all possible 
alternative categories of human are targets for investigation through 
the lens of the posthuman.   
Another interesting and contemporary reflection Ferrando 
makes in this domain is how a posthuman lens provides a relational 
overview, not just of the human through biological and geographical 
(physical) intra-connections between humans but also of how humans 
relate to the planet.  She does this by drawing on Teilhard de Chardin’s 
paper, ‘From the Pre-Human to the Ultra-Human: The Phases of a 
Living Planet’ (1964). This is particularly relevant today in our post-
COVID19 anthropocentric world where socio-economic recovery is 
interrelated with our ability to create a more sustainable environment. 
In many ways this can only really be achieved through a global 
overview of the key issues applied to a local context.   
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Archaeologically unpacking the term human, Ferrando reflects 
on its origins from Greek and Roman times – Greek for human is 
anthropos, giving rise to our use of anthropology, anthropocentrism, 
etc., but this also originally reflected culture and education. It was for 
example Aristotle who defined human as a political being, yet polis 
meant civilization and hierarchy within city life (Athens) at the time, 
where other was excluded and woman, slave, and non-Greeks were 
referred to as barbarian. Thus, the term human relates to culture, 
reason and civilization. In this context, Ferrando traces how the word is 
adopted by early playwrights but, in so doing, argues that it was mainly 
developed by free male intellectuals rather than including peripheral 
categories of human. This again is therefore exclusionary and positions 
the posthuman as a necessary development for progression, even 
though the term humanity is an attempt to reflect inclusivity in its 
broadest sense. 
From a scientific standpoint, Ferrando positions her discussion 
in the context of speciesism and the system of biological classification 
developed by Linnaeus (1758), where Homo sapiens was determined 
as a category of mammal (familia primate) defined by differentiating 
characteristics (genus, familia, ordo, etc.). Linnaeus’ Homo sapiens 
(referring to genus and species) also included a taxonomy of five 
groupings based on race (continent, skin colour and other defining 
features) as well as a monstrous taxon which dealt with outliers such 
as those with congenital disformities (dwarf, giant, other birth defects).  
This classification was based on a Eurocentric perspective which still 
informs our construction of human and within species differentiation 
today, not least because the methodology was configured by Western 
human endeavour. Following this line and situating the primacy of 
(Western) human, for example, Agamben (2002) argued that to be 
human, one must recognize oneself as human and, of course, this 
becomes problematic when considering different races classify 
themselves in different ways, such as according to cultural practices 
(eg., indigenous tribes). Ferrando argues that posthuman therefore 
destabilises Linnaeus’ classification, which is actually based on his 
strict Lutheran upbringing as much as it is scientific praxis, wherein 
woman nurtures (ordo of mammal derives from mammalia, meaning 
breast, a term coined by Linnaeus) and man engages in intellectual 
activities.   
In conclusion, the term human in posthumanism is not neutral 
but imbued with socio-political, economic and symbolic meaning that 
predetermines potential for exclusivity rather than inclusivity of other.  
Ferrando highlights the importance of recognizing these deficiencies in 
our use of the language and, through it, sets the scene for developing 
the field of philosophical posthumanism. 
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The final section of Ferrando’s text develops her thesis on 
philosophical posthumanism simply by asking what follows the 
anthropocene.  As well as situating her discussion within a geological-
chronological discourse drawing on Latour she also shapes this by 
drawing on Haraway’s ‘response-ability’ (2017) for shaping the Earth.  
Her approach is by way of asking how the anthropocene has been 
contested, highlighting Parikka’s (2014) anthrobscene (the obscenities 
of media ecologies), Moore’s (2016) capitalocene (profit-based) and 
Haraway’s (2016) chthulucene (where human and non-human are 
inextricably linked in tentacular practices).  She argues it is high time 
for a paradigm shift and does not much mind whether that is termed 
post-humanism, post-anthropocentrism or post-dualism.    
This is probably because Ferrando’s argument centres on Gaia 
theory as a ‘cosmic embodiment that cannot be silenced’.  Gaia theory 
connotes the interdependencies between all components of Earth, 
such as biological and geological structures.  Drawing on Stengers 
(2015) and Latour (2017), she makes a compelling argument that there 
is no future in which man will thrive by ignoring Gaia, albeit this theory 
subverts the trajectory of human Enlightenment. As she notes, 
however, man cannot simply be removed and even though the 
posthuman is a clear means by which to question the intra-
connections, ultimately even dead man in its bare form impacts Earth 
(as compost).  
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Rob’s Open Source Android, ROSA, built by Knight (2016), photographed on display 
at the Science Museum’s Robots: 500-Year Quest to Make Machines Human 
exhibition, 2017  
(image: author copyright) 
 
It is at this juncture that she creates an interesting link to the 
transhuman perspective, where life and death co-exist in a 
continuously evolving cycle of re-generation at both micro and macro 
levels (e.g., cellular and body).  If human life can be extended ad 
infinitum (Kurzweil), how relevant is this dichotomy within a posthuman 
turn? This leads her to question what is posthuman life, again engaging 
the reader with etymological and scientific perspectives.  Using the 
origins of Greek terms, she differentiates between bios (pertaining to 
man) and zoë (pertaining to all life), both of which are also socio-
politically derived.  She argues life is particularly difficult to define (e.g., 
virus is neither alive nor dead) and instead asks the question of the 
relativity of life to death as meaningful for understanding 
posthumanism.  Through this, animism is a term that is forwarded.  As 
Ferrando states, however, whilst grounded in Eastern philosophy 
(Shintoism), the term animism is useful as a transcultural (rather than 
Western hegemonic) perspective yet the dichotomy 
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(animate/inanimate) remains and is not particularly useful in 
understanding technologically advanced posthuman life.  Mori’s (1970) 
uncanny valley effect, for example, illustrates how inanimate robots 
may be perceived as animate and/or spiritual beings (Mori 1974) in 
many cultural contexts.  By way of example, the robot (Knight 2016) 
image above illustrates an anthropomorphic representation, but the 
particular robot identified was also programmed to move like a human 
which animates it.  
The robot/human discourse also results in otherness and 
consequential discrimination (e.g., anti-autonomous agents movement) 
and so Ferrando argues that philosophical posthumanism must 
consider the symbioses between human and other. This becomes 
particularly relevant in a technology context, where liveness of say a 
robot is a current hot topic in a number of fields including arts, 
humanities as well as science and technology.  Ferrando approaches 
the question by asking how life can be artificial, drawing on Langton’s 
(1986) notion of cellular automata as a means to interrogate why it is 
necessary to consider a machine as organic for it to be alive.  Life 
according to Langton is an abstraction of logical form emanating from 
molecular level code (e.g., DNA strings), his argument being that if it is 
simply code that determines life, then artificially codified life is possible.  
Ferrando then extends her discussion by considering the nature of 
virtual disembodiment as an illustration of logical form, taking 
Warwick’s (2012) and others’ position that it is preferable to have 
biological embodiment in order that a cybernetic organism may fully 
understand its physical environment and be persistently aware.   
Having turned this around to advance her thesis, therefore, 
Ferrando argues that a view of biological AI is a necessary perspective 
(again overcoming the dualism of organic/inorganic) to position 
Channell’s (1991) worldview of the future roles of genetics, quantum 
physics and super-intelligence.  She is quick to address the issue that 
such a perspective positions philosophical posthumanism as 
technocentric, arguing that by addressing the animate/inanimate 
dualism, the approach neither excludes nor places hierarchies on 
other.  Instead, the new discourse decentres the debate around 
primacy of one over another and allows for a broader discourse 
encompassing diversity and sustainability. 
The ability to do this is predicated on her argument around a 
common ancestor – a primordial single cell from which all life on Earth 
is believed to have begun, drawing on Lamarck’s (1809) transformism 
where characteristics are inherited between generations, Darwin’s 
(1852) On the origin of species by means of natural selection and 
Woese’s (1998) argument that a universal origin is a process that 
connotes gene transfer across a community of cells which combine 
and recombine into organisms through evolution.  Evolution is 
11
Harwood: Post-pandemic Posthuman Worlds
Published by DigitalCommons@URI, 2020
evidenced in the general ability to interbreed between species (of 
course there are exceptions) and as such there are likely to be no fixed 
boundaries as implied by Linnaeus’ classification system.  Evolution is 
therefore a natural-cultural continuous process notwithstanding that 
eugenics (selection for desirable traits) and epigenetics (the influence 
of nurture) have resulted in undesirable aspects such as primacy and 
exploitation (e.g., racism, ableism and genocide). Ferrando uses 
Shiva’s (1995) counter-argument against genetic modification as an 
example of perverse yet inevitable post-anthropocentrism which raises 
political, economic, social and ethical issues. Artificial selection is a 
posthumanities worldview because it opens the discourse to both 
posthumanist and transhumanist perspectives. 
Focussing on a bioethical perspective of technological 
enhancement, philosophical posthumanism raises many questions not 
so much related to the whether it is possible and what comes after, but 
more whether it should be allowed in the first instance.  This is not just 
about the human condition but about the role of human in other.  
Ferrando’s discussion centres on the precautionary versus 
proactionary principle, posited by More (2004). The precautionary 
standpoint describes a legal/illegal dichotomy for the transhuman 
based on the potential for creating disparity and discrimination.  The 
proactionary standpoint is about dealing with the consequences as 
they arise but by fundamentally recognizing the freedom [of people] to 
influence their own evolution.  Technological enhancement, by its very 
nature, brings into question the roles of others – who has control over 
the technology, what happens to the data it generates, etc. giving rise 
therefore to further socio-political considerations. For example, 
Ferrando discusses intervention at the molecular level to enhance 
human life prospect (removing the likelihood of contracting life limiting 
conditions such as cancers and diseases from our genetic code) but 
perhaps, taking her Gaia argument forward, that intervention might 
view the prospect of reproductive rates of one decentred entity, without 
hierarchical primacy, to balance and sustain planetary conditions 
thereby reducing human lifespan or tolerance to natural conditions.  
Her posthuman perspective of technological advancement is therefore 
incomplete and avoids some of the thorny discourses that exist today 
around global sustainability and the posthuman, albeit she does revisit 
this later in the text. 
Drawing on Maturana & Varela (1972/1980) to further explore 
the notion of life and its role in the posthuman, Ferrando turns to the 
issue of self-sustaining life (autopoiesis) as a cognitive process. She 
reflects on Haraway’s (2017) view that nothing is really capable of self-
organizing, preferring instead to use the term sympoiesis to describe a 
relational process.  Cognition is a scientific construction of knowledge, 
whereas epistemology is a philosophical approach (the actual process 
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versus the how it happens). To illustrate her point, she uses an 
example of the frog: observed by Maturana and others, the eye of the 
creature only recognizes food when it behaves like food, a moving 
insect say, whereas if food around it did not move it would starve. This 
indicates a species-specific organization of language. Her point is 
made in the context of understanding ethics of human experimentation 
on animal other and its role as a methodology for the posthuman, 
where such experimentation is largely justified and undertaken as a 
methodology of human advancement (over other).  
She extends the point to assess life of the robot, drawing on 
Turing’s (1950) groundbreaking work to argue that if a machine acts 
intelligently then perhaps it is and the posthuman is thereby about 
perspectivism.  Thus, the human-centric fear of a potential existential 
threat from artificial intelligence would be replaced with a plurality of 
embodiment.  To further her discussion, she aligns Nietzsche’s view of 
perspectivism on which posthumanism draws heavily. Nietzsche (1901) 
stated that there are no absolute truths, only interpretations. It is the 
interplay of different interpretations and situated standpoints that 
provides the basis of a plurality of understanding about the posthuman. 
Albeit his examination of this was from an acknowledged human 
standpoint, he was aware of, and did not rule out, other in his 
discourse.  Ferrando argues this is consistent with Braidotti’s notion of 
embodiment (of mind), which rather than being separated as 
mind/body, recognizes the ‘embrainment’ of body. This is in tune with 
the discourse that the body does not have to be biological (e.g., Barad, 
2007) which allows Ferrando to discuss alternative embodiments such 
as avatars and shamanism. 
Ferrando also engages in a discussion of matter and its 
relationship to other, enabling her to critique Object Oriented Ontology 
(OOO) (e.g., Harman 2015). She states that although there are 
common elements, the central thesis of OOO gives primacy to other 
over human, which diverges with a dualistic standpoint of philosophical 
posthumanism. The argument centres on the relevancy of matter, 
through which Ferrando interestingly explores string theory. From 
physics, string theory (different to particle physics) is the view that all 
subatomic matter is a vibrating, uni-dimensional string of energy, which 
gives rise to particles based on the characteristics of the vibration, 
which in turn is relational to other strings (Randall 2005). As a theory of 
quantum physics, the vibration of a string is said to produce a graviton 
resulting in gravitational force. String theory is therefore an 
underpinning theory that incorporates all fundamental interactions of 
the universe. Ferrando suggests posthumanism is consistent with 
string theory because it aligns with the deconstructed/reconstructed 
post-dualistic approach. This premise of philosophical posthumanism 
thereby provides the basis for some very interesting future prospects 
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such as the multiverse, where the current space-time continuum may 
be only one materialized dimension of many possible alternatives. 
 
 
Eric and box 
(image: Katie Page, used with permission) 
 
The final part of her thesis is therefore about the possibilities of 
the multiverse as a philosophical tenet of posthumanism. This is a bold 
concept to say the least, and draws on different theories including 
physicist Schrödinger’s famous cat thought experiment to explain how 
quantum mechanics may be applied to pragmatic scenarios. The 
multiverse theory still highlights dichotomies: here/there, this 
world/other worlds, this universe/other universes – ‘there’ being the 
most distant and unreachable prospect of human imagination which 
Ferrando argues would benefit from post-humanist, post-
anthropocentric and post-dualistic reflection.  Her treatment of this is 
not trivial. She examines the concept through a philosophical 
construction of a posthuman multiverse using a relational perspective 
by describing a ripple effect of vibrating strings. In such a way, she 
argues that strings are intra-linked, resulting in or ‘revealing’ 
(Heidegger) nodes in a material network. To explain her thoughts 
further, she uses the metaphor of a rhizome as a possible source of 
expansion of multiverse theory where any part of the root (think ginger 
or dahlia or the hyperlinked internet) can spur a new root, resulting in 
an intra-connected non-hierarchical structure, drawing on Deleuze & 
Guattari (1987). Ultimately, Ferrando emphasizes that her argument is 
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a position on posthumanist ontological existentialism which, by being 
both monistic and pluralistic, is post-dualistic. 
In conclusion, the text is a foray into a broad range of 
perspectives that enable the author to critique and position 
philosophical posthumanism.  She situates her work in both humanism 
and anthropocentrism and destabilises the centricity of the human from 
other in the process.  Whilst ending at a largely untestable 
philosophical point, the multiverse theory, her means of arguing for a 
more sustainable or balanced approach as a posthuman is compelling 
and potentially provides an interesting lens through which researchers 
could in future deconstruct and explore global and local markets. 
Reflections on the Post-Pandemic Worlds 
Where Ferrando’s text highlights the issues around resolving the 
dualism of other in order to improve the relationships between 
humanity and our environment, COVID-19 has highlighted the 
imperative for doing so.  We may well be posthuman from a range of 
perspectives, but we are certainly not post-dualistic.  The economically-
derived ecosystem through which humanity perceives its environment 
remains an existential threat in a post-pandemic world (e.g., Dholakia & 
Atik 2020).  
The pandemic has brought to the fore of our consciousness 
some of the most profound challenges faced in resolving how we 
acknowledge human other, especially at the margins of hegemonic 
techno-scientific endeavors through which vaccines have been 
developed and deployed, and communities pacified. For example, 
whereas a local response has been to target older and weaker 
members of communities, the global response has been based on 
nationalism, education and access to healthcare systems.  Other in this 
case are those peoples whose lives are shaped by poverty, communal 
drift and exclusion. Yet without addressing the dualism in humanity 
surely environmental challenges faced as a consequence of divergent 
consumption practices can never be balanced.   
All species, including humans, are hard-wired to survive and 
dominate over territories (Darwin 1859; and other evolution theorists), 
which of necessity pits the self against some other and its environment. 
At best, this could be described as an harmonious ecosystem, and at 
worst, a parasitic relationship. The current posthuman challenge is 
therefore not to resolve the dualism but to find a survivable balance for 
optimal longevity, recognizing the wider socio-techno-environmental 
ecosystem in which humans exist with its finite yet evolving others in 
what Latour and Weibel (2020) refer to as the critical zone of material 
Earth – that thin habitable region between the Earth’s outer crust and 
space which does not exist elsewhere in the known cosmos. Afterall, 
neither humans nor others have anywhere else to go.   
15
Harwood: Post-pandemic Posthuman Worlds
Published by DigitalCommons@URI, 2020
Alas, to calculate such planetary balance is beyond even our 
most advanced computational and scientific capabilities at present 
which further serves to highlight the precarity of humanity and the 
strength or survivability of Gaia, depending on whether one’s 
perspective is as an active or passive interrelationship. Either way, 
what is optimal in such a context? Who knows, but more importantly 
why should humans care?  Ultimately, this is a function of basic human 
need, possibly redefined as perceived quality of co-existence. Such 
‘need’ underpins the ethos of the United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals, but if our post-pandemic world is to achieve 
relational balance, then the United Nations must include all nations and 
representation of all peoples with the best science we can bring to bear 
on each and every issue.  Today’s posthuman, reflecting in Ferrando’s 
terms, is frankly still clearly centering the human over non-human 
others. This is as much about equality in consumption as it is about 
environmental sustainability. It was only in 2009, for example, that a 
few predominantly European countries recognized the sentience of 
animals in its policies, albeit this primarily relates to their treatment in 
the food chain and only then in the event that policies exist within 
countries to protect them as ‘not things’ (e.g., Hudson 2019). This goes 
no further therefore than positioning humans as lip-servants to 
saviorism. 
So, what about markets in the posthuman post-pandemic world? 
At its heart, a market is an anthropocentric exchange-based micro-
ecosystem. This has some merit in achieving a foundation of balance 
among humans and possibly a limited number of other species (pets) 
through a process of virtuous [re-]distribution – what is of value to one 
may well be of little value to another, and so on.  It also is the premise 
of social enterprises and technology enabled platforms which have 
become sharing-based economies and digitized commons (e.g., Kwet 
2020). These emergent rhizomic markets are, however, not viable 
without policies that underpin the provision of basic needs for human 
survivability, which in turn implies a means to legitimize a universal 
value derived from exchange – the wicked problem that emerges of 
course is always about whose value the exchange is pegged against.  
Thus, for a socialist environment to prevail, a complete overhaul of 
existing market concepts and structures is required, yet how this could 
be realized in our globalized hyper-connected environment (Hong 
2020) is far from clear.   
What is interesting in the context of connectivity, however, is 
that it is not just humans that are connected. There are now 
innumerable animate, inanimate, organic and inorganic entities which 
are connected through a vast web using cloud, edge and satellite 
computing technologies to derive insight for those educated in 
assimilating and reading the language of digitized data and code 
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(known as the ‘Internet of All Things’). Others with such skills may not 
be human but machine, or a network of machines, where intelligence is 
the currency of exchange. It may be that by working relationally with 
machines, as hypothesized by Lovelock (2019) in his thesis setting out 
a post-anthropocentric world, the fundamental need to find and support 
balance and harmony is achievable.  
Such ‘intelligent’ machines would act as translators between 
humans and others effectively becoming a post-dualistic binding organ. 
As we have seen with the numerous dark web incursions on markets 
over the past months and for years by various state-operating 
organizations, however, when the data-based environment is not 
regulated with a global value system derived from equality, chaos 
ensues. Our relationship with ‘intelligent’ machines has therefore not 
begun well with power having slipped into the hands of a few self-
interested entities but perhaps it is not too late to address the 
problems.  Certainly, the environment is filled with complementary 
empathic drive which creates a much-needed groundswell, what 
Haraway (2017) refers to as sympoiesis. It is ‘simply’ that the binding 
techno-organ has not yet learned to bind.  
Concluding Observations 
This Dialogue contribution, substantially through a review of Francesca 
Ferrando’s (2019) book entitled Philosophical Posthumanism, has 
explored the nexus which we find ourselves at as a consequence of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Ferrando’s thesis helps us to assess the 
precariousness of our humanity by developing our understanding of 
ourselves and our relationship with others – other nations, other 
species, other worlds. Through analysis, it becomes evident that whilst 
we are posthuman through a multitude of different lenses, our transition 
is incomplete – the notion of other creates many challenges in our 
current market-based ecosystem and the dualism in us-other contexts 
prevails. Whilst it is clear that becoming cyborg through pandemic 
pressure has further exacerbated the unbalanced nature of our 
relationship with our environment, technology may yet be the binding 
organ that helps us reconfigure globalized markets to achieve equality 
and balance for a sustainable environment.   
This will need more speculative research at a metaversal level, 
combining virtual and physical environments and entities to develop 
new concepts in order to evaluate potential impacts on socio-techno-
environmental ecosystems.   
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